The Alliance That Was Never Signed, But Delivered When It Mattered Most
A year of silent coordination, real-time decisions, and battlefield trust built an alliance more powerful than any treaty. This is how it worked - and why it may reshape the Middle East.
The Invisible Alliance
Following the recent events in the Middle East over the last couple of weeks, there is a joke running around about NATO wanting to join Israel, rather than the other way round. Like many good jokes, this one contains a grain of truth.
The reality is that despite not having a formal regional Gulf defense treaty, many of the actors in the Middle East have been working together informally for over a year to protect against Iran’s terror army, proxies, and foul intentions. This invisible alliance, orchestrated by the United States, represented in the battlefield primarily by Israel, and supported by various Middle Eastern and European militaries, has functioned as if it were written in ink.
For years, the debate over a U.S.-Israel defense treaty circled diplomatic circles. Would it pass the Senate? Would it bind Israel’s hands? Would it be activated when it mattered? But as the past year has shown, maybe that question is now outdated. Maybe what we needed wasn't a treaty but a shared understanding of reality.
The British Affair
While we would love the world to be black and white, in reality, it is a complicated place.
From the early days of the war that Iran’s proxies launched on October 7, 2023, I was in regular contact, sometimes daily, with U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin, as well as with defense ministers across Europe and beyond. Many reached out in the first days to express support. Later, they offered cooperation. At times, they raised objections to specific policies or actions. We didn’t always agree, but the tone was always collegial, and the interest was genuine. What we were doing was unprecedented: tunnel warfare on a national scale, managing a seven-front campaign, combining air force and intelligence units in real time, and deploying pager-style special operations. These were revolutionary, even for seasoned defense officials.
In April 2024, as Iran launched its first direct missile and drone assault, the United States assembled an ad hoc defense coalition that included Israel, the U.S., France, the UK, and regional players. As the plan came together, Secretary Austin informed me of a legal complication. The British Secretary of State for Defence, Sir Grant Shapps, had contacted him with a concern. According to UK law, Britain could not assist a country at war unless it had been formally invited to do so. Shapps asked that Israel submit a formal request for assistance.
I understood the legal concern, but I could not oblige. In our history, at least since 1956, Israel has never formally asked another country to send military forces to assist us. I firmly believed then and believe now that we can defend ourselves by ourselves, so I was not going to start asking. So I told Austin I welcomed British support, but I wasn’t prepared to break the nation’s precedent or my own principles.
"So what do you propose?" Austin asked.
It is worth remembering that Israel was once under British mandate. Our military was originally modeled on the British army. Our parliamentary system, like our legal tradition, owes much to Westminster. After 35 years in uniform and a decade in public life, I understood the bureaucratic pressures facing my British counterpart.
So I offered a compromise that I hoped would honor both Israeli principles and the British flair for bureaucracy: "Grant," I said, "write me a letter asking that I request British support, because your law requires it. And in reply, I will write you a letter stating that I respect your legal process."
He did. I did. And with that exchange of letters, the partnership was formed.
When John Healey succeeded him as Secretary of State for Defence, a similar dance ensued in October. Despite coming from opposing political parties, both men followed a similar path. I view this as testimony to the validity of the principle.
Nations that share interests, and no less than that, nations that share values, find ways to overcome obstacles and work together to defend those interests and values.
Ahead of Fordow: The October Campaign
The background to this second escalation began on July 27 of 2024, when Hezbollah launched a rocket at a soccer field in the heart of Majdal Shams, a quiet town in Israel’s north. At the time, a children’s soccer match was taking place. Twelve young lives were lost. Thirty-four more were wounded. The oldest was sixteen. The youngest was ten.
In response, we made a clear decision: to pursue and eliminate those responsible. Four days later, in Beirut, we tracked and killed Hezbollah’s Chief of Staff, Fuad Shukr, also known as Haj Mohsen, the highest-ranking military commander in the organization.
That name may be familiar to some readers. Haj Mohsen was the same man who orchestrated the 1983 Beirut barracks bombings, which killed 241 U.S. Marines, 58 French soldiers, and eight Lebanese civilians.
At the same time, we received confirmed intelligence that Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh was in Tehran, meeting with senior figures in the Ayatollah regime. He was staying at a heavily secured IRGC guest house reserved for VIPs. We acted on that opportunity. He was eliminated.
Shortly after, a decisive campaign began that would leave Iran and its proxies in shock. Hezbollah, for all practical purposes, was dismantled. The turning point was what became known as the Pager Operation. It was followed by Operation Northern Arrows, in which tens of thousands of missiles and launchers across southern Lebanon were destroyed. These weapons were aimed at Israeli cities. Their removal effectively neutralized the military threat posed by Hezbollah for the foreseeable future. And it culminated in the elimination of Hassan Nasrallah in his underground bunker in the Dahiya quarter in Beirut.
The blow to Iran and its proxy strategy was immense. The humiliation was public. Tehran began preparing its response.
That retaliation came on October 1, 2024, when Iran launched 200 ballistic missiles toward Israel. But we were ready. Under the leadership of Secretary Austin on the American side, and mine on the Israeli side, alongside General Kurilla, Chief of Staff HaLevi, and General Eyal Zamir - then serving as Director-General of the Ministry of Defense and today Israel’s Chief of Staff leading the military front of the war on Iran - we assembled a second ad hoc defense pact. This one expanded beyond the April coalition. It included the original members, as well as several additional European and Gulf states whose names shall remain anonymous.
This time, the coalition did not stop at defense. While American THAAD batteries and AEGIS-equipped naval platforms formed the backbone of our missile shield, the United States also backed and supported the Israeli offensive that followed on October 26. In that strike, the Israeli Air Force targeted and destroyed Tehran’s ballistic missile production infrastructure. Even more critically, it eliminated the last four operational S-300 radar and air defense systems, clearing the skies from Israel to Tehran and setting the conditions for the aerial campaign that followed in June 2025.
With Hezbollah no longer effective, Iran’s ballistic missile production reduced dramatically, and an open aerial corridor to Iran’s heartland, three of the four prerequisites for an Israeli preemptive strike on the Iranian nuclear program were in place.
It might be worth stating the obvious: our attacks on Hezbollah and Iran were not impulsive or spontaneous. They were the result of a long-term strategic plan, grounded in decades of intelligence collection and operational experience. That plan was sharpened in the summer of 2023 through intensive preparation, including round tables and war games with our closest allies. It was refined ahead of each campaign and executed with near-perfect precision when the moment came.
June 2025: The Preemptive Strike
The fourth prerequisite, American support, was the capstone. Less than two weeks after Israel’s second retaliation against Iran on October 26, U.S. elections were held. The new administration had the opportunity to act. And it seized that opportunity with both hands.
Following the failing diplomatic talks, both Israel and the U.S. decided that the free world could not allow Iran to possess nuclear weapons. Washington did not hesitate. What had been quietly discussed and rehearsed for months became reality.
On June 12, 2025, Israel initiated the operation. In its opening offensive, our aircraft targeted Iranian missile factories, nuclear scientists, heads of the military and IRGC, nuclear enrichment sites, and more.
Ten days later, the United States deployed B-2 strategic bombers from bases in Europe and the Gulf. Those aircraft dropped Massive Ordnance Penetrators on the Fordow enrichment facility near Qom, as well as on sites in Esfahan and Natanz.
It was the most complex joint strike ever conducted by Israeli and American forces. And it was not just a show of firepower. It was an expression of resolve. Each side did what only it could do. Israel led the campaign. The United States gave it strategic depth and international weight. Together, we dismantled the operational core of Iran’s nuclear program and redefined what partnership looks like under fire.
As Niall Ferguson and I wrote in The Free Press, Israel had already eliminated critical targets, but Fordow remained. Only the United States had the tools to destroy it. Only President Trump could give the order. And when he did, what followed was not symbolic. It was strategic.
What Comes Next: An Alliance Proven in Action
After the June strike, many wondered aloud what kind of agreement must now be written, or what structure must be formalized. But those questions may already be behind us.
The current regional alignment, spanning Israel, the United States, key Gulf states, and European partners, has proven more agile, more operational, and more durable than any formal pact we could have drafted. It did not emerge from a diplomatic summit. It emerged from shared threats, mutual confidence, and the realities of the battlefield.
This informal alliance, built in urgency and refined in coordination, did not wait for ratification. It functioned and triumphed without delay, without headlines, without ceremony. It proved that shared values and operational trust can outperform any clause or article.
We should stop asking whether we need a treaty. The real question is whether we are ready to acknowledge what we already have.
And for those still clinging to old frameworks, consider this: when a British defense minister sends you a letter asking you to ask him for help; when Gulf states coordinate airspace behind closed doors; when American and Israeli pilots fly missions minutes apart over hostile territory - that is not diplomacy. That is deterrence. That is an alliance.
Over the years, I’ve learned that in the Middle East, speeches, declarations, and even signed agreements mean very little. What counts is performance on the ground. Stability, prosperity, peace - only come through strength.
What we have now is not a document. It is a reality, and an opportunity.